Peru Elections 2011

Peru: What's Next for Humala?

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 15:10:39 -0500

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers, June 17, 2011

Reprinted from Foreign Policy in Focus:

http://www.fpif.org/articles/peru_whats_next_for_humala

Left-wing candidate Ollanta Humala emerged the victor in the most highly polarized and contested presidential elections in Peru’s recent history, in which polls showed the candidates in a statistical dead heat going into the June 5 vote. Humala won with 51.5 percent of the vote, while his opponent, Keiko Fujimori — daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, now serving a 25-year sentence for human rights violations committed during his 10-year authoritarian regime — received 48.5 percent.

Humala captured the vote of those who feel left out of Peru’s steady economic growth of the past 10 years. His constituency wants social policies that go beyond handing out food aid, as Fujimori’s father did, to include programs that generate jobs and improve the quality of life, as Humala has promised to do. He also ultimately gained the support of those reluctant to endorse either candidate. In the end, this pivotal group decided that Humala was a better option than another Fujimori in the presidential palace.

Humala moved to the center to win the elections. With a slim majority in Congress and a still-strong conservative opposition, however, he may well find it difficult to implement even his moderate program of change.

Volatile Electoral Process

Humala’s rapid ascent in the polls prior to the first round of voting on April 10 caught observers by surprise. Just a few weeks prior to the elections, he was polling in the low teens, and former President Alejandro Toledo was considered a shoe-in for the first round vote. But by mid-March, Toledo started to slip in the polls, while Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, a businessman who served as Toledo’s prime minister, saw his numbers rise. In the end, Toledo, Kuczynski and two-time mayor of Lima Luis Castañeda Lossio split the center-right vote. Together, they captured nearly 44 percent, while Humala came in first with 31.7 percent and Keiko Fujmori came in second with 23.5 percent. Fujimori basically maintained a solid block of about 20 percent of the electorate that has supported her father ever since his regime collapsed in 2000 in the wake of massive corruption scandals and charges of electoral fraud.

The results illustrate the volatility of electoral politics in Peru. If the vote had been held a few weeks earlier, Toledo would have likely beat out Fujimori in the first round. Had it been held a few weeks later, Kuczynski had a good chance of emerging victorious. In the end, the fragmented political field allowed Fujimori to make it into the second round. And Humala would most likely have lost to Toledo or Kuczynski in a second round vote. Ironically, the two candidates with the highest negative ratings made it into the second round. Polls prior to the first round revealed that over 50 percent of the population said that they would never vote for either Humala or Fujimori. In the second round, then, many voters found themselves forced to choose between the “lesser of two evils.”

Several factors help explain these results. Political parties have all but disappeared, along with strong political allegiances. Although each of the top five candidates had a core block of support, none generated much enthusiasm among the electorate more broadly. And apart from Humala, all were proposing more or less the same: continuity with market-oriented economic policies.

Perhaps the most surprising element of these elections is that the daughter of a former president who fled the country in disgrace after 10 years of massive corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations came so close to the presidency just 11 years later. This is especially so since Keiko Fujimori ran on a platform invoking the legacy of her father’s government. Ironically, at her post-election rally after the first round of voting, supporters did not yell her name, but rather “Chino, Chino, Chino”—a popular nickname for her father. Although she tried to distance herself somewhat from her father’s government as the second round of voting neared, she was less successful than Humala in the race to the center. In the end, Humala convinced more voters that his move from a radical to a more moderate agenda was more sincere than Keiko Fujimori’s efforts. Humala was also able to move past allegations that he supported an attempted coup – led by his brother Antauro, now in prison — and that he committed human rights violations as an army captain during Peru’s internal armed conflict. Many voters decided that a return to Fujimorismo would have been worse. Keiko Fujimori also became the candidate of Peru’s economic elite, which proved to be detrimental to her support in poorer sectors.

Humala’s effort to moderate his discourse and reach out to the political center during the second half of the campaign was crucial to his victory. He sought to distance himself from Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, with whom he was closely associated in his previous run for the presidency in 2006. Instead, Humala refashioned himself as a disciple of the highly popular former Brazilian president Luis Inacio Lula da Silva. He also broadened his team of advisers to include a range of progressive and moderate Peruvians. The new technical team produced a consensus document that reflects this broadened political coalition. The document proposes to improve Peru’s vastly unequal income distribution while respecting the free market economic model. At the same time, Humala’s team has promised to make the Peruvian state more transparent, to root out corruption, and to respect democracy and human rights. Most importantly, the new plan offers a government of concertacion nacional, or a government of national unity. The outspoken support of Nobel Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa was also decisive in increasing support for Humala among undecided voters.

Of particular concern, during the sharp and polarizing political process — which lasted a grueling two months between the first and second rounds — the race- and class-based divisions that are such a remarkable feature of Peruvian society resurfaced with a virulence not seen since the height of the internal armed conflict in Peru. Peruvians concerned about the tone of racist remarks created a Facebook page called Democratic Shame in which people could denounce such behavior. Over 7,000 people have joined the page and have shared offensive remarks they have received or observed in the course of the campaign. Ollanta Humala’s Facebook page was frequently tagged with racist comments and posts, such as: “Shitty Indian, renounce your candidacy.” Tackling the underlying racism and classism that reared its ugly head in this electoral process will be a long-term and difficult process.

Political Transition

For the most part, Humala has gotten off to a good start in calming the political waters after the elections, promising a government of national unity that brings together the country’s diverse political sectors. Fujimori supporters jumped the gun by demanding, even before Humala was declared the official winner, that he announce his economic team to reasssure national and international investors – even though key Humala advisors repeatedly said that there will be no nationalizations or property confiscations and that they would ensure macroeconomic stability. Conservative economic elites are threatening to withdraw investments from the country if Humala strays from economic orthodoxy and will no doubt show resistance to even moderate policy change, such as increasing taxes on mining companies (hardly considered radical in Latin America today).

At the same time, Humala will have to move quickly to implement the promises of his campaign to make Peru a more equitable and inclusive society. Humala’s victory is a stunning metaphor for the long-standing divide between Lima and the rest of the country. Though he lost by a significant margin in the capital (where Fujimori got 58.4 percent of the vote) and in some northern departments, he won 17 of 26 regions outright, concentrated in the south, central, and jungle regions of the country. He took Puno with 78 percent of the vote, Cusco with 75 percent, and Ayacucho with 73 percent. He won with over 60 percent of the vote in Apurímac, Arequipa, Huancavelica, Huánuco, Madre de Dios, Moquegua, and Tacna. Humala did not win a mandate for radical change, but he certainly has a mandate for some change. In particular, he has a mandate to address the concerns of the provinces regarding the concentration of economic and political power in Lima. Yet at the same time, Humala won by moving beyond his core political base to gain support from more moderate sectors. Some of these moderates support Humala’s vision of a more just country, but they may have very different ideas about how to achieve that change. In short, he will face pressures from all sides.

Another major challenge Humala faces is a deeply fractured Congress, which since 1993 has been a unicameral body and now has 130 members. His Gana Peru coalition has 47 congressional members. Humala thus lacks an outright majority that would allow him to easily implement his economic and social programs. He also faces a powerful and usually united opposition in Keiko Fujimori’s Fuerza 2011 which has 37 members, with potential allies among another 20 representatives from right-wing parties, which will most likely try to block his social and economic proposals. However, the last-minute support thrown to Humala’s candidacy by former Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo has allowed him to build at least a short-term coalition with Peru Posible’s 21 congressional representatives, the third largest block in Congress. That gives Humala a potential total of 68 votes in Congress, an extremely slim majority, and short of the two-thirds vote required, for instance, to make appointments to key posts like the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office or the head of the Central Bank.

Finally, the way the second-round elections played out revealed the deep deficiencies still plaguing Peruvian democracy. Alberto Fujimori bribed or blackmailed the press into supporting his government. In a disturbing continuity, much of the mainstream media – owned by powerful economic elites —willingly supported his daughter’s campaign this time around, shamelessly presenting campaign propaganda as news. If the last two months are any indicator, the relationship between the government and the main media outlets could become quite antagonistic, which could have terrible consequences for Peruvian democracy and freedom of the press as well as the right of Peruvians to have impartial sources of national news.

Regional Implications

Another arena where Humala has sought to calm fears of radical change is international relations. He has immediately signaled the international community that his government will seek to maintain good relations with countries across the political spectrum. Hence, his first international foray to Brazil was followed by meetings with the presidents of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile – rather than the more radical leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador. Nonetheless, Humala’s victory reinforces the trend toward strengthening regional bodies and increasing independence from the United States.

Humala joins the group of progressive presidents that have taken office in South America in recent years: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Despite his conservative credentials, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has departed from former president Alvaro Uribe’s unconditional loyalty to the US government, seeking to shore up relations with Colombia’s neighbors, playing a stronger role in regional forums, and at times taking positions different from those of Washington. The only outlier in South American political dynamics now is Chile’s right-wing government. All indications are that Humala will strongly back and seek to strengthen the South American Community of Nations, UNASUR, which is playing an increasingly important role in regional diplomacy – and in standing up to Washington. He will also likely seek to revitalize the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and consistently engage with MERCOSUR. In other words, Humala’s election gives a boost to regional integration efforts.

Humala’s first foreign visit after his election sends a clear signal that Brazil is likely to be his primary point of reference in international relations. At the same time, initial indications are that U.S.-Peruvian relations will remain solid for now. Throughout the campaign, Humala reiterated his desire to have good relations with Washington. Following his election, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reached out with an invitation to visit Washington and Humala has indicated his intention to travel to the U.S. capital. Given that the United States has no ambassadors in neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador (or in Venezuela), it behooves the Obama administration to maintain a good working relationship with the incoming Humala government.

Humala’s Victory in Peru’s Elections Inspire Hope, but Challenges Abound

Wed, 08 Jun 2011 11:37:41 -0500

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

With nearly 99.697 percent of the vote counted as of this morning, Ollanta Humala has maintained a three point lead over Keiko Fujimori, assuring his victory in Peru’s hotly contested presidential elections. Humala has maintained his three point lead, with 51.5 percent of the vote compared to 48.5 percent for Keiko Fujimori. Humala’s win was hailed by many as a victory for democracy and the promise of social justice. In the end, despite the highly polarized electoral climate, hope defeated fear.

Yet as noted by Peruvian analyst Carlos Basombrío, Humala’s honeymoon appears to be over before it even began. Despite the fact that he has yet to be declared the official winner, since Sunday night Fujimori supporters have been demanding that he announce his economic team in order to calm the nerves of national and international investors – this notwithstanding that key Humala advisors have repeatedly said that there will be no nationalizations or property confiscations and that they would ensure macroeconomic stability. Yesterday Humala announced his transition team, which will be led by his Vice Presidential candidate, Marisol Espinoza. The list reflects the diversity of views that his campaign came to represent, including, for example, more left-wing economists such as Félix Jiménez and Humberto Campodónico and the moderates who joined forces with Humala in the second round, such as Kurt Burneo, who was the deputy Economic Minister, and Daniel Schydlowsky, who was the head of the state bank, COFIDE, under the Toledo government.

Humala is already being pressured from all sides. He will have to implement the promises of his campaign to develop economic and social policies that will make Peru a more equitable and inclusive society – promises which brought him over 30 percent of the vote in the first round. But he won on Sunday by moving beyond his political base to gain support from more moderate sectors who in many instances voted for Humala in order to prevent Keiko Fujimori from being elected president, which they feared would mean a return to the corrupt and undemocratic practices of her father’s government. While some of these moderates support Humala’s core idea of the need to achieve a more just country, they may have very different ideas about how to achieve that change.

Humala is also under tremendous pressure from conservative economic elites who are threatening to withdraw investments from the country if he strays from economic orthodoxy and who will no doubt show resistance to even moderate policy change, such as increasing taxes on mining companies (hardly considered radical in Latin America today). Experiences in neighboring countries, such as Bolivia, give credence to concerns of attempts at economic sabotage by those staunchly opposed to Humala. Indeed, in her surprisingly late concession speech (although it was clear on Sunday night that Humala was poised to win the elections, Keiko Fujimori waited until 5:30 pm the next day to admit her defeat), Fujimori warned that she represents 48 percent of the population and that her supporters will insist on “continuity” with regards to the prevailing economic model.

Humala’s victory is a stunning metaphor for the long-standing divide between Lima and the rest of the country. In stark contrast to past Peruvian elections, as noted in Otra Mirada, for the first time Lima and the agro-export northern regions of the country did not determine the winner. Though he lost by a significant margin in Lima (where Fujimori got 58.4 percent of the vote) and in some northern departments, he won 17 of 26 regions outright, concentrated in the south, central and jungle regions of the country. He took Puno with 78 percent of the vote, Cusco with 75 percent, and Ayacucho with 73 percent. He won with over 60 percent of the vote in Apurímac, Arequipa, Huancavelica, Huánuco, Madre de Dios, Moquegua and Tacna. While it may be fair to say that Humala did not win a mandate for radical change, he certainly has a mandate for some change. In particular, he has a mandate to address the concerns of the provinces regarding the concentration of economic and political power in Lima.

Another major challenge Humala faces is a deeply fractured Congress, which since 1993 has been a unicameral body and now has 130 members. His Gana Peru coalition has 47 members of Congress. Humala thus lacks an outright majority that would allow him to easily implement his economic and social programs. He also faces a powerful and usually united opposition in Keiko Fujimori’s Fuerza 2011 which has 37 members, with potential allies among another 20 representatives from right-wing parties (including APRA’s four representatives), which will most likely try to block his social and economic proposals. However, the last-minute support thrown to Humala’s candidacy by former Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo has allowed him to build at least a short-term coalition with Peru Posible’s 21 congressional representatives, which constitute the third largest block in Congress. That gives Humala a potential total of 68 votes in Congress, an extremely slim majority but a majority nonetheless. It remains to be seen whether or not Humala will be able to hold this coalition together in order to initiate crucial social and economic changes – and fend off the likely incessant attacks from the political opposition.

With the second largest voting bloc in Congress, Fujimori’s Fuerza 2011 is a political force to be reckoned with. Yet as Gustavo Gorriti asserts in IDL-Reporteros: “Despite the statistics, the defeat of fujimorismo leaves this movement with an uncertain future.” He points out that even with the support of Peru’s powerful economic sectors and business associations, Cardinal Juan Luis Cipriani (an outspoken member of Opus Dei), the major media and President Alan Garcia, Fujimori still lost the election.

Of particular significance for Keiko Fujimori is what now happens to her father. Securing his release from jail remains a primary objective of his supporters and now there will be even more pressure for some action to be taken before Humala assumes office on July 28. As we reported previously, it appears that the Constitutional Tribunal is poised to accept a writ of habeas corpus presented by Alberto Fujimori’s attorneys, which would amount to a revocation of the ratification of the original sentence. If that happens, a new trial to review the appeal of the April 2009 conviction would be held that could lead to Fujimori’s exoneration, or to a different sentence that could facilitate a presidential pardon.

Alternatively, Peru’s president could immediately pardon Fujimori. (Although Peruvian law prohibits pardons from being granted to those convicted of aggravated kidnapping, as was the case with Fujimori, and international law prohibits pardons from being granted to those convicted of crimes against humanity, it would hardly be the first time that a Peruvian president subverted the law.) Already, there are calls for Garcia to do just that. Just two days after the elections, APRA Congressman Jorge Vargas called on Garcia to pardon Fujimori on humanitarian grounds, due to his age and allegedly poor health. An opinion poll already shows that most Peruvians oppose granting a pardon to Fujimori. It would be a true mockery of the will of the Peruvian voters if after they rejected the return of fujimorismo, the convicted former president were set free.

WOLA Senior Fellow Jo-Marie Burt discusses Ollanta...

Mon, 06 Jun 2011 15:28:39 -0500

WOLA Senior Fellow Jo-Marie Burt discusses Ollanta Humala’s victory in Peru and challenges he will face when he assumes the presidency on July 28 on Al Jazeera English (June 5, 2011).

Humala Wins Peruvians voted June 5. The results indicate that...

Mon, 06 Jun 2011 14:25:00 -0500

Humala Wins

Peruvians voted June 5. The results indicate that Ollanta Humala, a center-left candidate, will be the country’s next president. Adam Isacson talks to WOLA Senior Fellow Coletta Youngers about what Humala’s victory means for Peruvian politics and U.S. policy.

Political Polarization: Humala's First Challenge

Mon, 06 Jun 2011 12:24:00 -0500

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

With Ollanta Humala the virtual winner of Peru’s presidential elections, it is time to think about the very real challenges he faces as he prepares to take office on July 28, 2011.

Before analyzing the real policy and governance challenges facing Humala, we thought it important to examine an immediate challenge he faces: the need to calm the waters in Peru after a deeply polarizing political process, that pitted his nationalist proposals against the more conservative program of Keiko Fujimori. It is important to remember that Humala and Fujimori were the two candidates that generated the highest degree of rejection among Peruvian voters on the eve of the first-round elections. In the second round, then, many voters found themselves forced to choose between the “lesser of two evils.” This resulted in a sharp and polarizing political process, which endured a grueling two months between the first and second rounds.

The polarization rippled through Peruvian society. Families were divided over which candidate to support. One middle-class lawyer told us that she supported Humala because she was vehemently opposed to a return to fujimorismo, but that the rest of her family supported Fujimori, and they implored her not to publish negative stories about Fujimori on her Facebook page. When she refused, her brother refused to speak to her.

More worrisome, the race and class-based divisions that are such a remarkable feature of Peruvian society came to the fore with a virulence not seen since the height of the internal armed conflict in Peru. This was seen in the media, with remarks with racist undertones or even overt racism were heard frequently. Aldo Mariategui, the director of the right-wing daily Correo, wrote in his column on the day before the elections warning that Humala would be a dangerous choice for Peru and implored his fellow citizens to vote for Fujimori in sharp, denigrating tones, “Peruvian, don’t be stupid at the voting booth tomorrow.” Fernando Szyszlo, the famous Peruvian painter, said that Peruvians faced an impossible choice in Sunday’s electoral contest. A triumph of Ollanta Humala, he said, “would be the triumph of the uneducated, of the ignorant, of those who do not know what is good for the country.” If Fujimori triumphed, he said, it would be “a victory for the corrupt.”

Peruvians concerned at the tone of racist remarks created a Facebook page called “Democratic Shame” in which people could denounce such behavior. Over 7,000 people have joined the page and have shared offensive remarks they have received or observed in the course of the campaign. One post read: “Shitty Indians!!! Only they could be so ignorant!!!” Another said: “Shitty Puneños… Die of cold, now let Ollanta send you clothes!” (Many people from Puno, especially children, have died due to extreme cold weather in Puno in recent years, and there have been frequent charity campaigns to prevent more deaths.) Ollanta Humala’s Facebook page was frequently intervened with racist comments and posts, also posted on Democratic Shame’s Facebook page. After the first-round vote, one Facebook user posted: “Shitty Indian, renounce your candidacy” while another said, in allusion to Humala’s supporters, “Son of a bitch, no one wants you, people who vote for people like you have know idea of what would happen if you become president, they are ignorant just like you…”

Peru is undoubtedly a society marked by deep racism. This was noted by Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which identified long-standing racism and exclusion as the root cause of the violence that devastated Peru in the 1980s and part of the 1990s. The current climate of polarization is deeply informed by this racism and by the classism that accompanies it. Humala has promised a government of national unity that brings together the country’s diverse democratic sectors and that is open to the participation of Peruvian civil society. This is an important step in the right direction, but tackling the underlying classism and racism that reared its ugly head in this electoral process will require much more than that.

LATER: Policy and governance challenges facing Ollanta Humala

At 88% of Official Count, Humala Close to being Declared Victorious in Peru Elections

Mon, 06 Jun 2011 10:24:00 -0500

by Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

The most recent results posted by Peruvian electoral officials early Monday morning confirm the victory of Ollanta Humala in Peru’s hotly contested elections. With 88.375% of the vote counted, Humala has won 51.276% of the vote, while Keiko Fujimori has 48.724%.

Last night, Humala gave a brief speech in which he noted that the results of the quick count vote put him as the winner in Sunday’s contest, but said that he would wait until the final official results before declaring victory. Humala’s conciliatory tone was remarkable given the high drama surrounding Peru’s elections and the deep polarization that marked the two months between the first round election results on April 10 and yesterday’s second-round vote.

Humala noted that his first task would be to “build a Peru that is more just and less unequal.” But, he noted, “not everything is possible, and will imply effort and the union of all Peruvians.” He said he would put in place a government of national unity that represented democratic forces in Peru and that was open to the participation of civil society.

He then left to join his supporters, who were gathering in Peru’s historic Plaza de Dos de Mayo to celebrate Humala’s almost certain victory.

Humala supporters at the Plaza Dos de Mayo Sunday night Source: AFP

As of 10:00 a.m. Monday morning, Keiko Fujimori had yet to emerge publicly to acknowledge her defeat. Sunday evening she gave a very brief speech in which she said she would await the result of Peruvian electoral officials before making any comments on the elections.

Later today: Post-election analysis: What Awaits Peru Under an Humala Administration

Humala supporters celebrate Humala’s apparent victory in...

Sun, 05 Jun 2011 21:30:00 -0500

Humala supporters celebrate Humala’s apparent victory in Peru’s presidential elections at the Plaza Dos de Mayo in downtown Lima. Source: La Republica

Transparency quick count confirms Humala victory in Peru Presidential Elections

Sun, 05 Jun 2011 19:32:56 -0500

by Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

The elections watchdog group Transparencia released the results of its quick count in today’s presidential elections, confirming the earlier exit poll results giving a victory to Ollanta Humala in today’s presidential elections. According to Transparency, Humala obtained 51.3% of the valid votes, while Keiko Fujimori obtained 48.7%.

Transparencia’s quick count is based on 90 percent of the ballots counted. The margin of error in Transparencia’s count is one percentage point. Official results are expected later this evening.

Transparency noted that 83.77% of registered voters participated in today’s elections. The absenteeism rate of 16.23% is similar to that of the first round, at 16.29.

Exit Polls Show Humala Victory in Peru Presidential elections

Sun, 05 Jun 2011 16:34:00 -0500

by Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

Polls closed in today’s second-round presidential elections in Peru.

All three exit polls that have been released to date show Ollanta Humala as the winner of today’s elections.

Ipsos Apoyo: Ollanta Humala 52.6% Keiko Fujimori 47.4%

Datum: Ollanta Humala 52.7% Keiko Fujimori 47.3%

CPI: Ollanta Humala 52.5% Keiko Fujimori 47.5%

Exit poll results are traditionally considered unreliable, but the consistentcy of the results by the three polling firms is leading analysts to suggest that Humala will be declared winner in today’s vote.

Transparency’s quick count results, which are considered widely reliable predictors of the final vote, are expected to be released at 6:30 p.m. in Peru.

Analysts suggest that the campaign focusing on human rights violations committed during Alberto Fujimori’s government, and especially the issue of forced sterilizations, was seen as major issue, in the final week of the campaign. During the 1990s, an estimated 200,000 women were sterilized without their consent as part of a government poverty reduction campaign. During a televised interview, Rafael Rey Rey, who ran as vice-presidential candidate on Keiko Fujimori’s ticket, said that, the sterilizations “were not against their will, but without their will.” This splitting of semantic hairs was widely discredited by the opposition media and in the Peruvian blogosphere.

Another factor that may have played a role in Humala’s apparent victory is that his coming on top of the polls in the days just before the final vote may have swayed undecided voters to cast their ballots for him.

The fear-mongering campaigns we reported on in earlier campaigns did not, apparently, achieve their intended effect of convincing a majority of Peruvians that Humala represented a danger to economic and political stability.

Peruvian blogger Marco Sifuentes said this was not a victory to celebrate nor to panic over. He pointed to three key lessons from today’s vote. First, he said, Peruvians do note like being told who to vote for, and they don’t like campaigns based on lies. Second, he said, Lima is not Peru. (Keiko appears to have been victorious in Lima and a couple of other departments in the north, but Humala won in the rural and jungle areas of Peru.) Finally, he noted, the mobilizations against Keiko Fujimori raised awareness, was powerful and effective, even with the media opposition it. But, Sifuente said, “Humala has been warned: he does not have a blank check.”

Polarized Peruvian Electorate Votes Today for President

Sun, 05 Jun 2011 15:02:00 -0500

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

Left-wing candidate Ollanta Humala appears to have a slight edge as Peruvians vote today in the most hotly contested election in the nation’s history. The final polls taken before today’s vote all show Humala overtaking Keiko Fujimori, who had been leading slightly, by 1 to 4 points, though given the margin of error most polls still show them in a statistical tie. Humala has captured the vote of those who feel left out of Peru’s economic boon and want programs will go beyond handing out food aid, as Fujimori’s father did, to creating programs to generate jobs and improved quality of life, as Humala has promised to do. However, the last minute surge in support may be more due to those who have been reluctant to endorse either candidate deciding that Humala is a better option than putting another Fujimori back in the presidential palace.

These elections have all the makings of a Gabriel Garcia Marquez novel. It was just over ten years ago that Alberto Fujimori fled the country in disgrace after beginning an unconstitutional third term as president that provoked massive popular protest and amidst myriad corruption scandals. Fujimori and his political allies literally stole billions from the country’s state coffers, institutionalized death squad activity, and subverted Peruvian democracy by taking control over virtually all state institutions. Yet now his daughter Keiko Fujimori – surrounded by her father’s cronies – is within grasp of becoming president. For his part, Ollanta Humala has a brother imprisoned for leading a revolt which he encouraged, led his own odd uprising against Fujimori and whose father espouses an ideology based on the racial superiority of Peru’s indigenous peoples. A significant portion of each candidate’s votes are a negative vote – those who would never vote for the other candidate.

The ways in which these elections have played out illustrate the deep deficiencies that still plague democracy in Peru. While during Alberto Fujimori’s reign, the Peruvian press was bribed or blackmailed into supporting his government, during this campaign much of the mainstream media – owned by powerful economic elites — has willingly supported the Fujimori campaign, shamelessly presenting campaign propaganda as news. (Such blatant manipulation of the press may have backfired, however, if the most recent polls turn out to be an accurate indicator of the electoral results. Also sadly reminiscent of the Machiavellian tactics used by Alberto Fujimori, there are well-founded reports that the Peruvian intelligence services have worked in favor of her candidacy.

The dirty tricks approach escalated as election day approached. In the last couple of days, a number of reports have emerged of a massive, coordinated disinformation campaign designed to discredit Ollanta Humala’s candidacy. IDL-Reporteros reported the creation of a false website, http://ollantaporperu.com on June 2, which seeks to associate Humala with socialism. This morning, the website states: “Peruvian comrades: Peru 2011: All power to the people! Humala President! By reason or by force: Ethnonationalism or death!” These messages seek to evoke an association between Ollanta Humala’s campaign and violent methods as well as the nationalist ideology of his father, which Humala has repeatedly and emphatically renounced.

Additionally, numerous people reported receiving phone calls, tweets, and facebook messages with similarly misleading and manipulative messages about Ollanta Humala. And IDL-Reporteros quoted actress Urpi Gibbons, who said that someone claiming to represent the “Inter-American Center for the Defense of Democracy” called her and said that they were conducting a poll about the elections. After asking who Gibbons was voting for, the caller then said: “I would like to know if you would like to have a president who will scare away foreign investors.” The caller then asked her if she knew that The Washington Post had published a report asserting that investors are pulling out of Peru, followed by the question: “Do you agree that the next government expel foreign investment, declares the United States an enemy, and nationalizes your property just as is currently occurring in Venezuela?” Dozens of other Peruvians denounced receiving similar phone calls. The messages are part of a broader, ongoing fear-mongering campaign that seek to associate Humala with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and assert that Humala will implement radical economic policies that will bring ruin to Peru’s economy.

Particularly disturbing is the extent to which this campaign has brought out the deep-rooted racism that still exists in Peru today and the acts of intolerance shown throughout the campaign. Facebook entries can result in a flurry of angry, foul attacks on the author; tweeting has become mean and nasty; and the name calling is often downright racist. As journalist Pedro Salinas writes: “This campaign has unmasked the true nature of a society marked by differences and discrimination. Social media have been inundated with offensive messages and insults that refer to the opponent’s skin color, their supposed ignorance and their uncivilized nature in order to disqualify them as Peruvian.”

Whoever wins today’s elections will inherit a country deeply divided and polarized. Most immediately, emotions are running high and both candidates must ensure that their supporters do not engage in any form of violence. In the longer term, these elections should serve as a wake-up call on the need for a serious process of societal reconciliation, the implementation of policies of inclusion rather than exclusion, and the strengthening of democratic values and institutions in Peru.

Is the U.S. Neutral in Peru’s Elections?

Fri, 03 Jun 2011 16:01:00 -0500

By Coletta A. Youngers

With less than a week to go before Sunday’s vote, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega, presented a report to the Peruvian government purporting to document Venezuelan government support for the campaign of presidential contender Ollanta Humala. According to Noriega, “We have a very sensitive source in Venezuela who says that Humala receives money, possibly from the Venezuelan Embassy in Lima, where cash is sent by military plane from La Paz (Bolivia), and from there across the border that is controlled by military attaches of the Venezuelan embassy in Lima.” In an interview with Univision, Noriega claims that “sources” in Venezuela have told him that Venezuelan military officers delivered cash for the campaign, but that he won’t release the report or the names of his sources so as to not put them in jeopardy. A high-level Peruvian government official told Univision that the report provided no proof of the allegations.

That Noriega sees Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as a threatening enemy is no secret. (Assistant Secretary from 2003 to 2005, Noriega was replaced by a career diplomat in large part for having driven U.S.-Venezuelan relations to the breaking point.) Yet somehow, despite his obvious enmity for Chávez, Noriega claims to have internal sources that have provided him with this information. Also highly questionable is his timing, which certainly appears to be intended to give Humala’s opponent, Keiko Fujimori, a boost before Sunday’s vote. Ironically, Noriega was given an award by the government of former President Alejandro Toledo for his work (then as a top aide to then-U.S. Senator Jesse Helms) for his efforts to bring an end to the Fujimori dictatorship of the 1990s. (Now that he is working to put another Fujimori back in the presidential palace, he should have the decency to return the award.)

Such meddling in the electoral politics of Latin American countries was commonplace during previous administrations, though it sometimes backfired. In 2002, Evo Morales came very close to winning the presidency (which he then assumed in 2006) after statements against him by the U.S. Ambassador, Manual Rocha, caused his popularity to jump significantly. To its credit, since assuming office, the Obama administration has refrained from public interventions in electoral politics. According to a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The United States supports the democratic process, including elections that are free, fair, and transparent, and looks forward to learning the outcome of Peru’s presidential race. The Peruvian people will choose the next president of Peru. Regardless of who is elected, the United States looks forward to continuing its strong bilateral relationship with Peru.”

Behind the scenes, however, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Rose Likins, is evidently playing a very different role. As reported in a previous blog, she has openly expressed support for Keiko Fujimori’s candidacy in private meetings, including with a group of human rights activists where she actually attempted to defend Keiko Fujimori’s human rights credentials. According to journalist Gustavo Gorriti, “The U.S. Embassy strongly opposes Humala’s candidacy.” Like Noriega, Ambassador Likins no doubt fears another progressive government in South America joining the ranks of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela – all countries more willing to stand up to entrenched economic interests and the United States.

It is certainly true that Peruvian PresidentAlan Garcia is now one the few consistent U.S. allies in the region. If Keiko Fujimori wins the elections on Sunday, it would be logical to assume that she would continue to play that role. However, it would be a mistake for the U.S. government to simply put Humala in the Chávez box. As reported previously – and despite Noriega’s claims to the contrary – Humala has sought to distance himself from Chávez, presenting himself instead as a more moderate candidate in the mold of the highly popular Lula in Brazil. Moreover, during the second round Humala has broadened his political support to include a range of progressive and moderate Peruvians. In short, if Humala were to win Sunday’s elections, it would behoove the U.S. government to reach out and try to work with him, rather than ending up in yet another situation of tense bilateral relations.

As is often the case in Washington, the official memory is short-lived. In the 1990s, the U.S. government was a key international actor in responding to human rights violations and the steady dismantling of democratic institutions in Peru. Developments there were seen as a direct threat to the democratic advances across the region and hence a threat to the U.S. government’s interest in promoting stable, democratic governments. Since then the U.S. voice has largely subsided. But a return to Fujimorismo in Peru would necessitate far more attention from the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration. Whoever wins Sunday’s vote, the U.S. government should be vigilant with regards to issues related to democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Peru and should work with its Latin American neighbors to ensure that the hard-fought gains of the last decade are not rolled back.

Finally, U.S. officials should not overlook the fact that a significant percentage of the population supports Humala – particularly in the southern and central parts of the country – which underscores the need address the countries’ real and deep inequities. While Peru has had impressive economic growth over the last decade, the levels of inequality have only improved slightly. Clearly, far too many Peruvians continue to suffer from poverty, extreme poverty, lack of opportunities for meaningful employment and a poor quality of life overall. If measures are not taken to address these issues – measures that go beyond food handouts – then the problems that Peru faces today will continue to grow larger, including social conflict and violence. Rejecting Humala as the “Chávez candidate” may be politically expedient for some, but negates the important role he has played in bringing the issue of inequality and poverty into the political debate.

Will Alberto Fujimori be set free?

Fri, 03 Jun 2011 11:40:00 -0500

By Jo-Marie Burt

On April 7, 2009 former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori was convicted for human rights violations in three cases: the Barrios Altos massacre, the forced disappearance of nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University, and the kidnappings of journalist Gustavo Gorriti and Samuel Dyer.

The legal proceedings against Fujimori demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that he was the key architect of a state plan to eliminate suspected subversives and opponents of his regime. He was sentenced to the maximum penalty in Peruvian law, 25 years.

The verdict was ratified on December 30, 2009 by a tribunal comprised of five Supreme Court justices. This was the final appeal, and the ratification means that Fujimori’s sentence of 25 years is firm and not subject to further appeal.

The Fujimori trial and sentence are regarded by Peruvian and international jurists, scholars and human rights observers as fair and impartial, and impeccable in guaranteeing and respecting the defendant’s due process rights. The Washington Office on Latin America organized several international missions to observe the trial and can attest to this directly.

Moreover, the guilty verdict against Fujimori has been hailed by international legal scholars such as Kai Ambos and Juan Mendez as a milestone in global justice efforts to end impunity and guarantee accountability for crimes against humanity such as forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture.

Fujimori did not question the impartiality of the judges nor did he impugn the proceedings against him while they were taking place. However, after the first sentence was ratified in December 2009, Fujimori and his allies launched a political and legal strategy to question the legitimacy of the verdict. This is because for the political project of fujimorismo, the release of Alberto Fujimori is an essential objective. Given the history of fujimorismo, especially its manipulation of the Judiciary and its trampling on democratic institutions to achieve its objectives, there is major concern among democracy and human rights activists that Fujimori could be freed using questionable methods.

There are two avenues by which Fujimori’s supporters have sought to have their leader released.

The first is via a presidential pardon. Since the initial verdict was handed down the question of whether or not the current president, Alan Garcia, would pardon Fujimori (presumably in exchange for a future promise of protection from prosecution for human rights violations committed during his first governmetn) or whether his daughter, should she be elected president in 2011, would pardon her father. From the day of his conviction, Keiko Fujimori repeatedly stated that her “hand would not tremble” to pardon her father.

However, there are significant problems with this avenue. Peruvian law prohibits pardons from being granted to those convicted of aggravated kidnapping, as was the case with Fujimori. International law prohibits pardons from being granted to those convicted of crimes against humanity; the judges clearly stated in their verdict that the crimes of aggravated homicide, assault and kidnapping of which they found Fujimori guilty are crimes against humanity in international law.

Moreoever, it would be costly politically to grant Fujimori a presidential pardon. The vast majority of Peruvians now believe Fujimori was guilty of these and other crimes, the Fujimori sentence is viewed positively by two-thirds of the Peruvian population. It is perhaps for this reason that Keiko Fujimori has recently pledged not to pardon her father if elected. Her change of heart may be related to her faith that a second avenue to freeing her father is still available: a legal strategy that seeks ultimately to overturn to overturn the Fujimori conviction. To this end, Fujimori’s lawyers have submitted no less than 17 writs of habeas corpus to Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal (TC).

The TC has agreed to hear at least one of these writs of habeas corpus, but has stated that it would wait until after the presidential elections to emit its ruling. This habeas corpus essentially challenges a ruling that denied Fujimori’s petition alleging that the Supreme Court judges named to review his appeal of the April 2009 verdict were not impartial and requesting their removal from the case. Human rights lawyers note that while the TC has handed down very important rulings in the years since Peru’s democratic transition in 2000-2001 that established important human rights jurisprudence in Peru, in recent years it has handed down several rulings that move away from some of this jurisprudence that represent a backsliding in efforts to combat impunity (for example in 2010 the TC ruled that crimes it had previously considered crimes against humanity, in which no statutes of limitations can apply, were in fact simple crimes and that statutes of limitation did apply).

If the TC were to accept the argument outlined in the writ of habeas corpus, it would amount to a revocation of the ratification of the original sentence, and a new trial would be held that could lead to Fujimori’s exoneration, or to a different sentence that could facilitate a presidential pardon. WOLA and its partners in Peru are deeply concerned at such a prospect, which is especially likely should Keiko Fujimori be elected president of Peru this Sunday.

Should this comes to pass, not only is it highly likely that Alberto Fujimori will be freed; it is also probable that Vladimiro Montesinos, along with other members of the Fujimori regime currently serving prison time for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and human rights violations will also be set free, and that a general amnesty will be put in place effectively ending attempts to achieve accountability for human rights violations committed in the context of Peru’s internal armed conflict. Such an outcome clearly puts Peru’s fragile democracy at risk. It would likely generate political and social discontent and instability, which could elicit the kind of repression and authoritarian practices of the Fujimori years that Peruvians have fought so hard so overcome.

Peru Elections Near: A Look at the Candidates

Wed, 01 Jun 2011 08:50:00 -0500

Part II: Ollanta Humala

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

After having come close to winning the Peruvian presidential elections in 2006, Ollanta Humala will once again compete in the final round of voting this Sunday, June 5, to determine who will be Peru’s next president; this time however, the outcome is far less certain than was the case the last time around when he faced Alan Garcia. While Keiko Fujimori maintains a slight lead over Humala, the most recent polls have the candidates in a statistical dead heat, with less than one percentage point difference between them. If this trend remains unaltered on election day, then quick counts may not be able to discern a clear winner, and official results could be delayed for two weeks or more. This could escalate the existing climate of polarization that is a notable feature of this drawn-out electoral process.

Both candidates have evoked strong negative reactions from sectors of the electorate. With less than a week to go, the percentage of voters who say that they would never vote for either candidate is very high, at 40 percent for Humala and 39 percent for Keiko (though this is down significantly from the first round, when 50 percent or more said they would not vote for either candidate). While many believe that Keiko Fujimori’s candidacy represents a return to fujimorismo of the 1990s– characterized by the dismantling of democratic institutions, human rights violations, massive corruption, and impunity—for others Humala’s candidacy has evoked fears of the emergence of another Hugo Chávez-style government that could subvert democracy and transform Peru’s economic “success story” into an economic ruin.

Yet the Ollanta Humala of 2011 is presenting a quite different image from the Humala who nearly defeated Alan García in 2006. Humala has sought to distance himself from Chávez, presenting himself instead as a more moderate candidate in the mold of the highly popular former Brazilian president Luis Inacio Lula da Silva. Indeed, when Chávez spoke out about the first round of voting, Humala asked him not to intervene in Peruvian politics. And while the press has spread rumors of Venezuelan campaign contributions, no evidence of such support has been found.

More importantly, since the first round of voting Humala has broadened his team of advisers to include a range of progressive and moderate Peruvians, such as economists Danny Schydlowsky and Javier Iguiniz, jurist Fransico Eguiguren and others. The new technical team has produced a consensus document that reflects the broadened political coalition, which lays out a government program oriented towards improving Peru’s vastly unequal income distribution while respecting the free market economic model, promises to make the Peruvian state more transparent and to root out corruption, and that guarantees respect for democracy and human rights. Most importantly, the new plan offers a government of concertacion nacional, or a government of national unity.

Critics claim that this is a ploy to appeal to moderate voters, and that once in office, Humala will revert to his radical, leftist ways of the past. However, others believe that Humala’s conversion is genuine —and that there will be significant popular pressure on him to abide by his campaign promises. This includes Nobel Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa, who had famously said prior to Peru’s first-round vote that having to vote between Humala and Fujimori would be like having to choose between AIDS and terminal cancer. Days after the first-round vote, however, Vargas Llosa came out in favor of Humala. He has since published articles and made several statements explaining his reasons for this decision, among them the need to prevent the return of the Fujimori-Montesinos mafia. When pressed in a recent interview about his support for Humala, Vargas Llosa said: “Humala today is surrounded by many more democratic individuals than those seeking a socialist revolution…If he wins the elections it will be because he has the support of an important sector of democratic, liberal Peruvians, like myself.”

Other prominent Peruvian intellectuals have made similar pronouncements, from writers to artists to academics, in support of Humala and insisting on the need to prevent a return of fujimorismo. Perhaps the most important endorsement this past week came from former President Alejandro Toledo. As Toledo led the battle against the Fujimori dictatorship in the 2000 elections, many political observers assumed he would, like others, back Humala in the final stage of the campaign. Toledo held out, however, until May 26 when he announced that his party “has decided to support, without any ambiguities, the candidate of Ollanta Humala.” That same day, Pedro Pablo Kuczysnki, not surprisingly, announced his support for Keiko Fujimori.

Even human rights groups that have criticized Humala in the past due to credible allegations of his involvement in human rights violations when he was a captain in the army during Peru’s internal armed conflict, have opted to support Humala, albeit reluctantly. The initial legal case against Humala brought by human rights groups was dismissed after the witnesses reversed their testimony, an occurrence that is disturbingly common in Peru, as witnesses are bribed or threatened into retracting their initial statements. A case is now moving forward in the courts in which a close associate of Humala is accused of doing just that. But recent revelations in La República suggest that some of these accusations may be a fabrication of the Peruvian intelligence services designed to discredit Humala, a disturbing indicator of how the methods of the past are being resurrected in an effort to assure Fujimori’s victory on June 5.

While some have criticized human rights organizations for taking a partisan position, the argument of many human rights activists is that in the face of the current electoral choices, they have no option but to vote for Humala to prevent a return of fujimorismo. For example, Ernesto de la Jara, the Director of the Instituto de Defensa Legaal (IDL), argues that he will vote for Humala because he is “absolutely certain that a return to Fujimorismo…is the worst thing that could happen to Peru… Humala is distrusted for a number of things that he could do, but Fujimori has already done them all: remain in power for longer than the Constitution permits; threaten freedom of expression and institutional independence; govern with the support of the military; approve a new, hand-tailored Constitution; have ties to Chávez; and be a populist, having the state’s resources at his disposal.” (See full statement here.)

After the first round of voting, many who absolutely rejected a return of Fuimorismo but had concerns about Humala called on the candidate to officially and publicly commit to respecting the democratic rules of the game. He did so on May 19 in a public ceremony, in which he swore on a bible and read a statement “in defense of democracy and against the dictatorship.” The ceremony was preceded by a brief statement by Vargas Llosa by videoconference from Spain. Though it was a landmark moment in Humala’s campaign, it got virtually no press coverage in Peru due to the overwhelming bias in the Peruvian media in favor of Fujimori’s candidacy that we reported on in a previous post. (Such is the scenario that yesterday, Vargas Llosa made public a letter to the director of El Comercio, Peru’s largest-circulation daily, saying he would no longer publish his weekly columns there since it has joined the Fujimori “political machine.”)

In his speech, Humala pledged that if elected he would respect the five-year presidential term limit and not seek any constitutional change that would permit his reelection; respect the independence and authority of the other branches of government; respect the human rights of all Peruvians and to avoid any type of political interference in investigations into human rights cases that are on-going or opened in the future (no such promise has been forthcoming from Keiko Fujimori); and respect and guarantee freedom of expression and of the press. He also pledged to implement policies to achieve a more just distribution of Peru’s economic resources and greater economic, social, political and cultural inclusion of all Peruvians, especially those living in poverty or extreme poverty, while ensuring that these changes will be carried out respecting the rule of law and taking into account the need not to risk and to stimulate economic growth. In so doing, he addressed the demand of many of his reluctant supporters that he formally pledge to respect the democratic rules of the game.

As we have clearly stated in previous posts, there are very real reasons to be concerned about an Humala presidency, particularly in the area of human rights. However, in 2011 he has presented a more moderate image, while remaining firm in his commitment to address Peru’s continuing and deep inequalities, and has taken steps necessary to broaden his political base of support. Whether or not his actions are sufficient to propel him to victory in the final round of voting remains to be seen.

Gustavo Gorriti on Peru’s Elections A Fujimori victory...

Tue, 31 May 2011 12:22:00 -0500

Gustavo Gorriti on Peru’s Elections

A Fujimori victory would be “a scenario most of us regarded as an impossible nightmare just a few months ago.”

31 May 2011

The final round of Peru’s hotly contested presidential election will take place on Sunday. Adam talks with renowned Peruvian investigative journalist Gustavo Gorriti, who runs the IDL Reporteros program in Lima, about what is at stake in the vote.

Click here to download the podcast.

Peruvians Organize Massive Anti-Keiko Protest By Jo-Marie...

Fri, 27 May 2011 18:47:00 -0500

Peruvians march against Keiko Fujimori

Human rights activists against Fujimori

Victims groups against Fujimori

Trade unions: Fujimori never again!

Women against Fujimori

Peruvians Organize Massive Anti-Keiko Protest

By Jo-Marie Burt

On Thursday May 26 an estimated 15-20,000 Peruvians participated in a peaceful march to protest the candidacy of Keiko Fujimori. Participants included human rights organizations, victims’ groups, trade unions, student associations, women’s groups, and artist collectives, among others.

“The people are speaking. They are saying that they do not want the return of the dictatorship,” said Rayda Cóndor, who led the march. Her son Armando Amaro Cóndor was one of the disappeared students from La Cantuta, one of the key cases that contributed to the 2009 conviction of Alberto Fujimori for human rights violations.

The offical press, among them Channel N, which played a crucial role in the downfall of the Fujimori dictatorship in 2000, reported that only 300 people were present at the march.

Photographs from Prensa Alternativa

Peru Elections Near: A Look at the Candidates

Thu, 26 May 2011 12:06:00 -0500

Part I: Keiko Fujimori

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta Youngers

With Peru’s second round elections less than two weeks away, the likely outcome is still anybody’s guess. Several polls now show Keiko Fujimori with a slight lead over Ollanta Humala, but taking into account the margins of error of the polls —as well as the fact that many do not reflect the rural vote— the fact is that there is a statistical dead heat between the two candidates. Keiko polls between 41 and 45 percent of the vote, with Humala at 39 to 41 percent. There are a large number of undecided voters, around 8 percent, and a not insignificant number of voters, between 7 to 12 percent, who say they will vote for neither candidate or will spoil their ballot. Interestingly, pollsters note that up to 30 percent of those approached have refused to respond to election surveys.

Keiko Fujimori’s poll numbers reveal that she has effectively gone beyond her traditional political base (which as we noted in a previous post has been steady since 2008 at around 20 percent) and has a real chance of winning the presidency on June 5. While doubts about Humala’s commitment to democracy and human rights are real enough, they pale in comparison to the setbacks that are likely should Fujimori take office. Given the legacies of fujimorismo it seems crucial to unpack the reasons behind support for Keiko Fujimori beyond her traditional support base.

Varias personas corren de trás de un camión que reparte regalitos de la campaña de Keiko Fujimori. Foto de La República.

Vote-buying. Following in the tradition of her father, Keiko Fujimori has engaged in massive vote-buying schemes, giving away food, toasters and other household items, calendars (featuring her father’s image!), coffee mugs and the like, around the country. Dánae Rivadenery, a journalist at the collective blogger site La Mula, broke a story about well-off women in Lima drumming up support from their friends and family to donate money and foodstuffs to such vote-buying campaigns to favor Keiko Fujimori’s candidacy. While some say this is a common practice in Latin America, it is important to remember that this practice reached extreme levels under the Fujimori regime in the 1990s. During the 2000 elections campaign, for example, over 50 percent of all Peruvians received food aid from the Fujimori government.

Elite support. In the current electoral climate, Peru’s conservative economic elite has clearly opted to support Keiko Fujimori. Apart from some notable exceptions, such as Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa, who has been a vigorous critic of Keiko Fujimori because he says it would lead to a return to the Fujimori mafia that so denigrated Peruvian democracy and institutions in the 1990s, the right has decided that their interests are better served under Fujimori than Humala. In particular, they fear that Humala will veer from the free-market economic policies that have served them so well in the past two decades. But beyond that, according to the highly respected sociologist Julio Cotler, as revealed by the virulent campaign being waged against Humala and his followers, Peru’s white elite fears a loss of status that an election by a middle-class mestizo who promises to redistribute wealth to poor urban and rural Peruvians would represent.

Fear-mongering. Fujimori supporters are using every tool at their disposal to depict Humala as an acolyte of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. As in 2006, a virulent campaign against Humala has been waged with the explicit intention of stoking fear and convincing voters not to cast their ballots in his favor. Charges of a Chavez-Castro takeover should Humala win, of a return to the state-led nationalizations and property confiscations of the Velasco era, of a Chavez-style assault on democracy, etc., have sought to discredit the Humala candidacy and favor Fujimori. One of the most outrageous examples of this came last Sunday when Peruvian Cardinal and Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani —a member of Opus Dei and long-time Fujimori supporter— openly criticized Humala in his homily.

Clear media bias. In the aftermath of the first-round vote, the vast majority of the Peruvian media has lined up clearly in favor of Fujimori’s candidacy, veering dangerously away from objective reporting to open partisan advocacy. In addition, there have been a number of disturbing reports of censorship and journalists being fired for not towing the pro-Keiko line of their media outlets. While every negative aspect of Humala’s background is being extensively covered in the press, there is very little examination of the corruption, human rights violations, and other atrocities committed during the Fujimori regime. There are notable exceptions, including La República and Caretas, and the new social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, provide outlets for alternative reporting. But overall there is a trend that is quite worrisome regarding press independence and objectivity. “The majority of Peruvian newspapers and TV news programs are working full-time to demolish Humala’s candidacy,” writes journalist Carlos Noriega in the Argentine daily Página 12. “The local press, with very few exceptions, is unscrupulously biased in its coverage in favor of the daughter of the former dictator Fujimori, whose regime controlled the press through massive bribery schemes.”

Emphasizing mano dura anti-crime policies. In the pre-election presidential debate, when asked how her government would address the problem of crime, Keiko Fujimori said assuredly: “If we defeated terrorism in the 1990s of course we can defeat common crime now. With a heavy hand.” To bring home her point she hired former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani to advise her on anti-crime policy, and together they have toured several major cities in Peru. The Peruvian press hyped up his visit as a real boon to the Fujimori campaign, paying little attention to the extensive criticism of Giuliani’s anti-crime policies and serious problems of related police abuse during his administration.

Keiko Fujimori’s electoral propaganda: “Security and opportunities for all”

U.S. Government support? Giuliani’s collaboration with the Keiko Fujimori’s campaign is just one element of a widespread perception that the U.S. government backs Keiko Fujimori in these elections. Adding to this, the media reported on a conference organized in Miami by Roger Noriega, former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and currently a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, publicly calling for the need to prevent an Humala victory in Peru. Noriega reportedly characterized Humala as little more than a new addition, along with Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, to the so-called “Axis of Evil.” Among the participants at Noriega’s event were former U.S. congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart and other Miami-based anti-Castro activists. While some have portrayed this as evidence of U.S. government support for Keiko Fujimori, in fact these individuals represent marginal and extremely conservatives sectors in the United States and while their views may be shared by some members of the U.S. Congress, they certainly do not represent the Obama Administration’s stance on Peru. That said, there have been disturbing reports that the U.S. Ambassador in Peru, Rose Likins, has endorsed Keiko Fujimori in private meetings with a number of different individuals.

Keiko Fujimori = Alberto Fujimori?

Some Keiko Fujimori supporters have argued that it is unfair to identify Keiko with her father’s government. Several months ago, in response to criticism of Keiko Fujimori’s candidacy, Alan Garcia said that children should not bear the sins of their fathers. Aside from the fact that Keiko was Peru’s First Lady from 1994 to 2000, rather than distancing her candidacy from her father’s legacy, Keiko has embraced his government as the “best in Peruvian history.” Her recent admission that her father’s government had authoritarian tendencies, and her acknowledgement that crimes such as the Barrios Altos massacre and the disappearance of nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University were committed under his regime, fall flat in light of her steadfast defense of his government and her insistence of her father’s innocence of any wrongdoing. And while Keiko Fujimori has backed off from her early promises to pardon her father should she be elected, she says openly that she is confident that the judiciary will free him (and reports have been circulating for more than a month that the Constitutional Tribunal, controlled by APRA cronies, is poised to do just that), and that if it does not they will appeal to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ironically the same body Fujimori withdrew Peru from because he did not like its verdicts, which challenged his anti-terrorism policies as violations of essential human rights). Another concern that has begun to be raised in the Peruvian media is whether Vladimiro Montesinos would be freed if Keiko Fujimori were to be elected president a what role if any he might assume in a Fujimori government. (We will analyze this topic further in a later post.)

The back-story here is that Fujimori and his followers have been planning their return to power since at least 2005, as described in a recent report by Gustavo Gorriti analyzing several recently released Wikileaks cables. One cable penned by former U.S. Ambassador to Peru James Curtis Struble describes a meeting he had with close Fujimori associates following Fujimori’s arrest in Chile in 2005 in which they outlined their strategy to return to power: to try to get Fujimori elected as president in 2006 (the cable subject line was “Fujimoristas try to sell their man as the mechanism to stop Humala”!); to try to get Fujimori elected into Congress in 2006 and from there lay the grounds for a presidential bid in 2011; or, failing either of those options, to chose a stand-in candidate to run for the presidency. With Fujimori’s extradition in 2007 and his conviction in 2009, notes Gorriti, the latter course became the only alternative, and Keiko Fujimori, the chosen one.

Note: Part II on Ollanta Humala to follow…

Giuliani, Fujimori and me: Nostalgia for the 1990s?

Mon, 23 May 2011 12:08:00 -0500

by Jo-Marie Burt

I lived part of the 1990s in Lima during the time of Alberto Fujimori. I lived the other part of the 1990s in New York when Rudolph Giuliani was mayor. Now, the mayor whose administration was criticized for being authoritarian and abusive, is advising (in terms of crime policy) the daughter of the former president (and now convicted felon) who was also criticized for being authoritarian and abusive. How ironic! After absorbing the news of the arrival of Giuliani in Lima and his multi-city tour with Keiko Fujimori in Peru, I decided to write this post.

Some of my friends and family members appreciated Rudy Giuliani; for them, he made the Big Apple more “liveable” with his politics “zero-tolerance” anti-crime policies. However, I and many of my friends had a different view. I remember Giuliani as a mayor who was disdainful, intolerant, authoritarian at times. I remember accusation after accusation of police abuse, disdain for the citiens of New York, and an inability to listen.

I participated in various marches and protests against the Giuliani administration. One of the largest demonstrations happened in March of 1999, when a young immigrant from Guinea, Amadou Diallo, was killed when 19 bullets shot by four New York City police officers penetrated his body. Diallo was not armed. The four police officers who killed Diallo said that when they approached Diallo, believing him to be a wanted criminal, he reached into his pocket; thinking he was looking for a gun, they shot and killed him “in self-defense.” They shot 41 bullets –yes 41 bullets– and 19 entered the body of Diallo, killing him instantly. Self-defense? Most of us rejected this argument, but not Rudy Giuliani.

The news of the assassination of Diallo sparked massive protests against the Giulini administration. The mayor had come under increasing accusations that his strong-arm anti-crime tactics were stained with racist attitudes and practices. A year and a half later, another police abuse scandal forced scrutiny of Giuliani’s strong-arm policies. In August of 1997, a Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, was detained and taken to the seventeenth district police station in New York City, where he was brutally tortured. The police officers sodomized him with a plunger, causing rectal and bladder wound that kept him in the hospital for two months.

Some, including of course Giuliani himself, maintain that these scandals aside, the get-touch anti-crime policies were the principal cause of the decrease in crime rate in New York City in the 1990s. This view has been challenged, however. Several studies suggest that economic growth at the national and local level, as well as demographic changes, offer better explanations in the decrease in crime rate observed during the period of Giuliani’s administration.

The Use of Lethal Force

The four police officers that killed Amadou Diallo were members of the “street crimes” unit whose principal task was to eliminate illegal drugs on the streets of New York. The police officers in this unit utilized automatic pistols that contained 16 bullets that are discharged in seconds. In Rudy Giuliani’s New York, the police had to follow certain rules: they were able to use lethal force only when the police believed that their life was in danger. But, according to The New York Times, “anytime they need to fire, they are trained to fire until the security risk is eliminated. They have orders to never fire alarm shots, but to aim at the center of the body, not at the arms or legs.”

The four police officers were tried in upstate New York, presumably because in the city they could not get a fair trial; unsurprisingly, all of them were absolved in what many considered a travesty of justice. Later the family members of Amadou Diallo sued the City of New York, claiming that Diallo’s civil rights had been violated. In March of 2004, they came to an agreement in which the family received three million dollars, the largest sum paid by the city of New York for a murder of this nature.

Giuliani, the Authoritarian, Then and Now

Giuliani never took protests against his policies seriously. Some time after the murder of Diallo, Reverend Al Sharpton, a recognized leader of the African-American community, began organizing daily protests next to City Hall in protest of the police brutality and alleged racism of Giuliani’s administration. But Giuliani, by and larged, ignored such protests. As a result, he lost the trust of many citizens who came to believe that his tactics and anti-crime policies were counterproductive, even criminal, and that his inability to listen to his critics reflected an incurable authoritarian tendency.

After his time as the mayor of New York, possibly to win a seat in the Senate and facing a popular rival, Hillary Clinton, Giuliani resigned. In 2005, he decided to take a shot at the presidential campaigns. Giuliani and several members of the GOP thought the strong-arm tactics in New York would give them an edge in the 2008 presidential elections. Giuliani was defeated in the Republican Party primaries and he abandoned his presidential hopes. and the truth surrounding his policies was forgotten as he faded from the political limelight. Perhaps this is why he has lent his services to consult on crime policy for presidential candidates in other countries as in the case of Keiko Fujimori.

In reference to the Louima and Diallo cases, New York University law professor Paul Chevugny- an expert on political violence in the Americas- told the journal The Independent, “I do not remember another moment in which there were two high profile cases of political misconduct in a big city at the same time. And the case of Louima is virtually unprecedented. It is like something you would here from a Third World dictator.” Ah, perhaps this is why Guiliani has associated himself with Keiko Fujimori. Both of them are nostalgic for the 1990s.

Peru’s Upcoming Presidential Elections and Fujimori’s Authoritarian Legacy

Thu, 28 Apr 2011 22:39:00 -0500

Peru’s Upcoming Presidential Elections and Fujimori’s Authoritarian Legacy

By Jo-Marie Burt and Coletta A. Youngers

Two polls released this week show Ollanta Humala with a small lead over Keiko Fujimori as the campaign heats up for the second round of voting in Peru’s presidential elections. With more than a month to go before the June 5 vote, it is far too soon to predict the electoral outcome. But one thing is clear: The rest of the campaign will get ugly, as right-wing sectors are very nervous about the impact of a potential Humala victory on their bank accounts. Most of the mainstream media – with the notable exceptions of the Lima daily, La República, and the weekly magazine, Caretas – is throwing its weight, and electoral coverage, behind Fujimori. Already, several prominent journalists have been fired out of concern that they would not be sufficiently sympathetic to Fujimori and the outspoken Jaime Bayly is going back on the air on Channel 4, presumably as an attack dog targeting Humala. As one Peruvian journalist told us, “we’re going to witness a lot of hysterical accusations in the next few weeks.”

What that press will not likely be covering is the tremendous damage Alberto Fujimori’s presidency wreaked on Peruvian democracy and the widespread human rights violations and massive corruption that prevailed under his rule. Since making it to the second round, Keiko Fujimori has sought to distance herself from the “excesses” that took place during her father’s regime, vowing to respect human rights and democratic practices. Though she started her campaign with a one-point platform – to pardon her father – she now claims that if elected she won’t release him from jail. But she has repeatedly stated that her father was one of the best presidents that Peru ever had; indeed, as the first round of voting approached her campaign ads featured more and more pictures of her with her father. Having surrounded herself with those that helped him rule during the 1990s (including Vice Presidential candidate and member of Opus Dei, Rafael Rey, as well as Fujimori’s former prime minister, Jaime Yoshiyama), it is ingenuous to think that another Fujimori government would not go down a similar path.

Keiko Fujimori now claims that her father may have had some authoritarian tendencies, but was not responsible for human rights violations. Her memory must be short-lived, as it was only two years ago that the Peruvian Supreme Court found Alberto Fujimori guilty of creating and operating a secret death squad, the Colina Group, that kidnapped and murdered Peruvians during the country’s internal armed conflict. In other words, Fujimori was convicted for having created and maintained the military and political structure that fostered human rights violations in the name of combating terrorism and that sentence was upheld on appeal by a second tribunal of Supreme Court justices. (See our article on the Fujimori verdict at http://www.fpif.org/articles/fujimori_faces_justice.) Moreover, he denied that such violations ever took place and protected those involved through a series of amnesty laws. In short, Keiko Fujimori claims that her father saved Peru from terrorism, but was not responsible for the human rights atrocities that were a fundamental tactic in the counter-terrorism strategy.

In a trial that was widely praised as impartial and respected fully due process guarantees, Alberto Fujimori was convicted and given a 25-year prison sentence for the 1991 Barrios Altos massacre in which 15 people were killed and four gravely wounded; the disappearance and later killing of nine students and a professor from the Cantuta University in 1992; and the kidnappings of journalist Gustavo Gorriti and businessman Samuel Dyer following the April 1992 autogolpe, or self-coup. The first two cases were carried out by the Colina Group, which operated out of the Army Intelligence Service and whose purpose was to eliminate suspected guerrilla sympathizers. But these were not the only atrocities committed by the clandestine death squad. It also carried out a series of assassinations and disappearances that are far too numerous to list here.

The human rights violations carried out under the Fujimori regime went far beyond those committed by the Colina Group. Forced disappearances were disturbingly common. Extrajudicial executions were carried out in peasant communities such as Chumbivilcas, Santa Bárbara and others. And thousands of innocent Peruvians were arbitrarily detained and imprisoned under draconian anti-terrorist legislation. The torture of anyone accused of terrorism was the norm. Fujimori himself was forced to form an ad hoc commission to review cases of los inocentes, the innocent ones, which ultimately led to the release of more than 500 people (and thousands more during the transitional government after Fujimori fled the country).

What allowed the Fujimori regime to get away with such atrocities for so long was that it also undermined the most basic elements of democratic governance, usurping the powers of other branches of government, demolishing the judiciary, rewriting the constitution to its liking, buying off or bribing major media outlets and constantly changing the rules of the game when necessary to consolidate control or perpetuate itself in office. It was only after public outrage reached a boiling point following Fujimori’s ascension to a clearly illegitimate third term in office and the release of videos showing his right-hand man, Vladimiro Montesinos, bribing opposition members of congress to switch party affiliation that the carefully crafted authoritarian regime came crashing down.

Before the regime’s demise, however, government officials, including Fujimori and Montesinos, bilked the country for billions of dollars. Fujimori has also been convicted for illicit appropriation of state funds and pled guilty to various counts of corruption. In 2004, Transparency International put Fujimori seventh in a list of the most corrupt former leaders in the world (following Haiti’s Jean-Claude Duvalier) for allegedly have stolen US$600 million. Over 200 individuals associated with his government have been convicted for corruption – and these do not include any cases where an appeal is still pending. In his book, Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru, Alfonso W. Quiroz estimates that the average annual cost of corruption during the Fujimori regime ranged from an astounding US$1.4 to 2 billion, at times reaching 50 percent of government expenditures.

As we have reported before, there are well-founded reasons to be concerned about a potential Ollanta Humala presidency. Sound allegations have surfaced of responsibility for human rights violations when he was a military commander in a jungle region during Peru’s brutal civil conflict. Some of his close advisers come from a military background – in a country where the military has not been known for its democratic credentials. And in the past, he has echoed some of Hugo Chavez’s anti-democratic rhetoric, though he has clearly distanced himself from such talk during this campaign. Yet as many people in Peru are now saying, “with Humala there may be uncertainties, but with Fujimori, there is proof.”

Keiko Fujimori: De tal palo tal astilla

Thu, 28 Apr 2011 13:50:00 -0500

Por Jo-Marie Burt

Para llegar a la segunda vuleta de las elecciones presidenciales, Keiko Fujimori se ha cubierto del manto del legado de su padre. En más de una ocasión ha afirmado que el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori fue el mejor que ha tendio el Perú en toda su historia. Ahora que busca ir mas allá del voto naranja, intenta moderar su discurso.

Ahora que busca ir mas allá del voto naranja, intenta moderar su discurso. Ante preguntas de medios afínes (ahora casi todos!) ha reconocido que el gobierno de su padre fue autoritario, pero jamás acepta que tiene responsabilidad por violaciones sistemáticas a los derechos humanos. En una entrevista reciente, Keiko Fujimori afirma que los militares cometieron los crímenes de Barrios Altos y Cantuta, y si su padre hizo un error fue al no castigarlos inmediata y severamente.(1)

Para la desmemoriada Keiko Fujimori y sus simpatizantes, habría que recordarles que tal como ha sido probado en el más alto tribunal de la justicia del país, su padre armó la estructura política y militar que permitió que esas violaciones se dieran. Es más, su padre hizo todo lo posible por negar la existencia de dichas violaciones y por proteger a sus autores, incluso la promulgación de las leyes de amnistía de 1995. Juega con la idea que el mismo Fujimori mantuvo a lo largo del juicio en su contra por violaciones a los derechos humanos: Salvó al Perú del terrorismo pero no es responsable de cualquier acto violatorio a los derechos humanos que se cometió en el camino. O sea, es el autor mediato de la lucha contra el terrorismo, pero no de las graves violaciones que se cometieron como parte de la misma. No, pues.

Alberto Fujimori fue condenado a 25 años de cárcel —en un juicio imparcial que garantizó con pulcritud su derecho al debido proceso— por tres casos: la masacre de 15 personas, incluso un niño de ocho años, en Barrios Altos; la desparición de nueve estudiantes y un profesor de La Cantuta; y los secuestros de los Sótanos de SIE. Pero no fueron los únicos casos de violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidos durante su gobierno. Tal como señala el fallo condenatorio a Fujimori, el temibe Grupo Colina, escuadrón de la muerte creado al interior de las Fuerzas Armadas con el avál de Alberto Fujimori responsable por Barrios Altos y La Cantuta, cometió una serie de asesinatos y desaparaciones por los cuales no ha sido enjuiciado Fujimori (debido a las reglas del tratado de extradición con Chile), tales cómo la desaparición de los campesinos de Santa, la desaparición del periodista Pedro Yauri, y el asesinato de la familia Ventocilla. (2) (3)

Pero la violación a los derechos humanos durante el régimen de Alberto Fujimori va más allá aún de los casos cometidos por el Grupo Colina. Está el tema de la detención arbitraria de miles de peruanos y peruanas por la draconiana legislación antiterrorista de 1992. El mismo Fujimori se vio obligado a nombrar una Comisión Ad Hoc para revisar estos casos y indultó a mas de 500 personas (miles más fueron indultados luego durante el gobierno de transición). No fueron terroristas, como Keiko Fujimori insinuó en el debate presidencial anterior a las elecciones, sino inocentes—y por eso fueron indultados.

Está el tema de la desaparición forzada, una práctica de las fuerzas de seguridad desde los años ochenta que continuaba durante los inicios de los noventa. Algunos de estos casos cometidos durante los noventa ya han sido judicializados y sus autores materiales sancionadas, como el caso de la desaparición forzada del estudiante universitario Ernesto Castillo Páez o las autoridades locales de Chuschi. Pero otros no, como la desparación del activista de derechos humanos de Huancavelica, Angel Escobar Jurado, o los estudiantes Martín Javier Roca Casas y Kenneth Ney Anzualdo, quienes protestaron por la presencia de agentes de inteligencia al interior de la Universidad Nacional del Callao y luego fueron desaparecidos —y, según el testimonio del agente del Grupo Colina Jesús Sosa Saavedra, fueron torturados y luego calcinados el los Sótanos del SIE.

Hubieron ejecuciones extrajudiciales en comunidades campesinas como Chumbivilcas, Santa Bárbara, y otros. Ejecuciones extrajudiciales de personas que el régimen fujimorista consideró peligroso por sus críticas al régimen, como el asesinato al secretario general de la CGTP Pedro Huilca Tesce. Ejecuciones extrajudiciales a personas rendidas, violación de toda ley de guerra, tal como se dio luego del rescate en la residencia del Embajador de Japón y luego del autogolpe en el penal Castro Castro.

Pero no se puede quedar ahí. El gobierno de Alberto Fujimori no sólo violó los derechos humanos al matar, torturar, y desaparecer a personas consideradas enemigas del régimen. También violó los derechos humanos al usurpar el poder, limitar la libertad de prensa, usurpar las funciones de otros poderes del Estado, corromper a los medios de comunicación, y robar descaradamente de la arca pública. Gobernar en base al miedo también viola los derechos humanos de los ciudadanos que no se sienten entonces seguros de poder ejercer libremente sus derechos de expresarse y de asociarse.

Será diferente un gobierno de su hija Keiko Fujimori? Difícil imaginarlo. Su intento de ir más allá de su base naranja queda chico, por decir lo menos. Ha reconocido el carácter autoritario del gobierno de su padre, y que se mató a los estudiantes de La Cantuta. Pero niega lo principal, lo evidente: que su padre fue el hilo conductor de un régimen nefasto que destruyó las ya debilitadas instituciones democráticas en el país, envilició a la política, y gobernó en base al miedo, la violación a los derechos humanos, y la corrupción. Culpa a Montesinos y la fuerzas de seguridad para limpiar a su padre, tapando el sol con un dedo, pues fue su padre quien dio poder a Montesinos y co-gobernó con las Fuerzas Armadas, que corrumpió para mantenerse en el poder. Por años Keiko Fujimori ha prometido que indultaría a su padre al ser elegida presidenta, pero ahora jura “por Dios” que no lo hará, probablemente segura de que otros lo harán para que ella quede limpio. De tal palo, tal astilla.

NOTAS

(1) http://www.larepublica.com.pe/25-04-2011/keiko-fujimori-el-gobierno-de-mi-padre-fue-autoritario

(2) J. Burt, “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations,” International Journal of Transitional Justice (November 2009)

http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/3/384.full

(3) Varios expertos nacionales e internacionales opinan sobre el juicio y condena a Alberto Fujimori: http://www.idl.org.pe/webpanel/informes/100417file_Libro%20conferencia%20Fuji.pdf

***

Este artículo fue originalmente escrito para La Mula: http://lamula.pe/2011/04/26/keiko-fujimori-de-tal-palo-tal-astilla/jomarie

In this episode of WOLA’s “Latin America Today,” host Adam...

Sat, 16 Apr 2011 10:01:00 -0500

In this episode of WOLA’s “Latin America Today,” host Adam Isacson records George Washington University Professor Cynthia McClintock giving a talk before WOLA’s board on the vote that has left Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori contending in Peru’s June presidential runoff.